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FEMALE-LED FIRMS AND GENDER WAGE POLICIES
 ANA RUTE CARDOSO AND RUDOLF WINTER-EBMER* 
Using a longitudinal dataset covering the period 1987–2000, the authors 
explore the impact of female employers and gender segregation on wages 
in Portugal. In the context of Becker’s (1957) taste for discrimination 
theory, they investigate whether the gender of a ﬁ rm manager affects 
gender wage differences. They ﬁ nd that females beneﬁ t from higher 
wages in female-led ﬁ rms than in male-led ﬁ rms. Further, when females 
lead, the wage gap between female and male workers is reduced by 
1.5%, regardless of the gender composition of the ﬁ rm’s workforce. At 
the same time, the higher the share of females in a ﬁ rm, the lower the 
wages overall for both female and male workers. The authors’ results are 
compatible with the notion that job promotion is an important factor in 
wage increases. The more females are mentored and promoted, the less 
men will be. However, as more females in the ﬁ rm compete for promotion, 
opportunities for both females and males to be promoted diminish. 
Females get lower pay than males for equal work, with numerous studies 
conducted over the years exploring 
possible reasons for this gender wage gap. 
In their meta-analysis of 263 international 
gender pay gap studies, Weichselbaumer 
and Winter-Ebmer (2005: 483) found, for 
example, that during the 1990s, females 
earned on average 26% less than males. 
When decomposing this earnings gap into 
a productivity-related component and an 
unexplained component, the authors found 
an unexplained gender pay gap of 19%. 
This pay gap has shrunk since the 1970s—
taking different methods of data collection 
and analysis into account—by only 0.17 
percentage points per year. Studies have 
explained these trends to a certain degree, 
in the context of labor market institutions 
and general inequality (Blau and Kahn 
2003), as well as of competition and equal 
treatment laws (Weichselbaumer and 
Winter-Ebmer 2007).
Surprisingly, less explored are the 
roles that supervisors, managers and 
entrepreneurs play in these trends. Notably, 
Becker’s (1957) taste for discrimination 
theory ascribes to employers a paramount 
role. Since employers set wages, examining 
male and female employers would 
presumably help to explain taste-based 
discrimination. Policy measures  in various 
countries exemplify this issue. Though 
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in the past equal opportunity and equal 
treatment laws dominated political agendas, 
the imposition of gender quotas or gender 
parity in top positions has replaced them. 
Promoting or hiring more females to top 
and inﬂ uential positions is intended to have 
both a direct impact on female employment 
and wages—particularly at the top end—
and an indirect one, since female decision 
makers might hire more subordinate 
females and pay them better wages.
Despite these arguments, the empirical 
literature on the impact of female 
employers on gender-based hiring and pay 
gaps is sparse, especially in the discipline of 
economics. In this paper, we focus on the 
impact of female leadership on the wages 
a ﬁ rm pays to its male and female workers 
and investigate whether the gender of the 
manager of a ﬁ rm has a signiﬁ cant effect on 
gender wage differences. In particular, we 
want to test the hypothesis that female-led 
ﬁ rms tend to protect and mentor female 
employees by paying them higher wages 
than male-led ﬁ rms would.
We use a longitudinal matched employer-
employee dataset covering the entire 
manufacturing and non-public service 
sector in Portugal for a period of more than 
ten years. The longitudinal character of our 
data allows us to control for ﬁ rm unobserved 
attributes that might be correlated with the 
gender of the employer by using ﬁ rm ﬁ xed 
effects. The impact of female managers is 
thus identiﬁ ed by situations where a change 
in management resulted in a different 
gender of the manager; uncontrollable 
structural ﬁ rm attributes could thus be 
eliminated. Additionally, we perform 
extensive robustness checks, such as 
restricting the analysis to new ﬁ rms, which 
are not constrained by past policies and 
regulations when setting their wage policy.
Gender of the Employer and               
Gender Pay Gap: Previous Literature
Both the role of employer preferences in 
wage setting and its inﬂ uence on the gender 
pay gap have been highlighted as early as the 
late 1950s when Becker (1957) introduced 
his theory of taste for discrimination. If we 
assume that female employers have less 
of a taste for discrimination than do male 
employers, Becker’s model would predict 
that employers with the lowest taste for 
discrimination—among them many female 
employers—will hire more female workers, 
but at the ongoing equilibrium wage. In 
a market with homogeneous workers, 
female-led ﬁ rms would not necessarily 
pay higher wages to females. In practice, 
of course, workers and jobs are far from 
homogeneous and job descriptions are 
typically not unambiguously deﬁ ned so that 
female employers can always place women 
in somewhat more favorable positions, 
with somewhat higher pay. Explicit positive 
preferences for females in the form of 
mentoring (Brown and Scandura 1994) 
might take the form of helping females 
to climb up the corporate ladder, leading 
them into on-the-job training and networks. 
Such practices might be considered to favor 
females, but they do not necessarily explain 
higher wages for females in female-led 
ﬁ rms. In the case of discrimination in the 
labor market, reduced discrimination could 
accomplish the same goal.
Wage differentials between women 
and men are often also associated with 
segregated workplaces. Gender segregation 
is interpreted in many studies as  a signal 
of bad jobs. Firms with a high share of 
minorities or females generally pay lower 
wages (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake 1987). 
Insofar as this phenomenon describes 
different job- or worker-quality in such 
ﬁ rms, segregation—that is, the share 
of female workers—across ﬁ rms can be 
interpreted as a confounding factor in 
studies of wage determination.  Jobs in 
more female-dominated workplaces might 
be different from those in male-dominated 
workplaces; in particular, they might differ 
in characteristics typically unobservable to 
the econometrician. Moreover, the number 
of females in the ﬁ rm might indicate the 
extent to which the ﬁ rm is female-friendly, 
a variable for which we might want to 
control. Alternatively, because mentoring is 
costly and time-consuming, it might not be 
possible to mentor all females equally in the 
ﬁ rm. We would thus observe that female-led 
ﬁ rms with a higher share of women in the 
workforce have more difﬁ culty mentoring 
and protecting female workers. The 
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allocation of more females to top positions 
in the ﬁ rm would presumably have a direct 
impact on the gender employment and wage 
structures, reducing the “glass ceiling” (see 
Albrecht et al. (2003) and Arulampalam et 
al. (2005) for evidence on increasing gender 
pay gaps further up the wage distribution). 
At the same time, it would presumably have 
an indirect impact since female decision-
makers may hire more females and pay 
them better wages.
Despite the relevance the gender of the 
employer may have to worker outcomes, 
the issue has received little empirical 
scrutiny, particularly in economics. This 
topic has been taken up, however, by social 
psychologists, who distinguish between the 
similarity–attraction paradigm (Byrne 1971) 
and the self-enhancement drive (Graves and 
Powell 1995). Whereas the former claims 
that individuals who are similar are attracted 
to each other, the latter argue that groups 
of lower-status individuals tend to identify 
with members of the higher-status group. 
Nearly all studies in management and 
social psychology relate to hiring decisions, 
experiments, or evaluations of recruiters 
(e.g., Graves and Powell (1995); Bon Reis 
et al. (1999); Heilman et al. (1988); and 
Goldberg (2005)), with mixed results. One 
extensive study by Bagues and Esteve-Volart 
(2007) investigated recruitment committees 
for Spanish public service positions and 
found that female recruiters treat female 
candidates more unfavorably. Giuliano et al. 
(2006) analyzed the impact of demographic 
differences between manager and worker 
on worker quits, dismissals, and ﬁ rst 
promotion, using duration models based on 
data on one large U.S. ﬁ rm. They found that 
gender and ethnicity differences between 
worker and manager have a relevant impact 
on worker outcomes—though larger in the 
case of ethnicity—and that such impact 
may be positive, if the manager occupies 
a “lower status” than the worker being 
supervised. Economists have studied the 
inﬂ uence of gender on their own profession 
in some detail. Broder (1993), for example, 
found that female reviewers of economics 
proposals for National Science Foundation 
grants graded proposals from females lower 
than they did  those for males. Blank (1991), 
however, found no gender-based differences 
in the way referees for the American Economic 
Review evaluated manuscripts submitted 
for publication. In another study, Hilmer 
and Hilmer (2007) and Neumark and 
Gardecki (1998) investigated mentoring 
by economics PhD advisors: working with 
a female advisor relative to a male one 
had practically no effect on early-career 
outcomes of young female economists.
The impact of gender segregation 
across ﬁ rms on wages has been given some 
attention in economics, with mixed results. 
Carrington and Troske (1995) and Bayard 
et al. (2003) showed that the concentration 
of women into lower-paying establishments 
in the United States contributes to the 
gender pay gap. Carrington and Troske 
(1995), likewise, demonstrated that a higher 
proportion of women in a ﬁ rm is associated 
with lower wages, both for females and 
for males; however, results by Vieira et al. 
(2005), using data on Portugal, indicate 
that a higher concentration of women in a 
ﬁ rm is associated with lower females’ wages 
but higher males’ wages. Concentrating 
speciﬁ cally on the gender of the managers, 
a few studies have dealt with the wage gaps 
for managers themselves (e.g., Bertrand 
and Hallock (2001); Bell (2005); Jurajda et 
al. (2006); and Lausten (2005)), whereas 
Smith et al. (2005) dealt with the effects of 
female managers on ﬁ rm performance.
We are aware of only three studies that 
investigate the wage effects of female 
managers. For example, Bell (2005) 
showed that in ﬁ rms led by women (CEOs, 
chairs, and directors), the gender gap 
between female and male executives has 
narrowed. Cohen and Huffman (2007) 
used aggregate data on female managers 
in particular industries to examine wages 
of non-managerial workers and found 
that industries with a higher percentage of 
female managers pay lower wages to both 
sexes. Hultin and Szulkin (2003) found for 
Sweden that a strong male representation 
among organizational managers is 
correlated with wider gender wage gaps. 
There is, therefore, still a long way to go to 
grasp the relationship between the gender 
of the employer and the gender pay gap, 
but the available data in Portugal may help 
us to shed some new light on the issue.
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Data Set and Con cepts Used
Data set
Our study is based on a linked employer–
employee dataset gathered annually by the 
Ministry of Employment in Portugal that 
covers the population of private ﬁ rms with 
wage-earners in the manufacturing and 
service industries. The years 1987 to 2000 
are used.1 Given the legally binding nature 
of the inquiry, the response rate is extremely 
high.
Reported data include the ﬁ rm’s location, 
industry, employment, sales, ownership, 
and legal setting; the worker’s gender, age, 
occupation, professional status, schooling, 
employment start date, skill, monthly 
earnings, and duration of work. For owners 
of the ﬁ rm, labor earnings and hours of 
work are not reported.
Full-time wage-earners aged 16 to 65 
and company owners are the focus of our 
attention. Firms in manufacturing and 
services in mainland Portugal, employing 
at least 10 full-time wage earners in at least 
one of the years, were kept for analysis. We 
have set this minimum ﬁ rm-size threshold, 
given our aim of analyzing the gender pay 
gap inside the ﬁ rm, to ensure that both 
minimum-employee and gender diversity 
objectives would be met. The size restriction 
means that we had to drop a large share of 
ﬁ rms in Portugal—but only a small share 
of the workforce—as reported in Appendix 
Table A1.
Identiﬁ catio n of Female-Led Firms
To identify the person(s) leading the 
ﬁ rm, we considered the following variables: 
    1.  Owner of the ﬁ rm. The variable 
professional status is coded as one of the 
following: owner, wage-earner, unpaid 
family member, or member of a cooperative. 
Owners are reported if they are actually 
“performing functions in the ﬁ rm.” Thus, 
if the owner is actively engaged working 
for the ﬁ rm, his/her identiﬁ cation is 
straightforward. 
    2.  Top manager. The variable occupation
1 However, for 1990 no worker data are reported.
is coded at the six-digit level using the 
Portuguese Classiﬁ cation of Occupations 
version 1994. Top managers were deﬁ ned 
either as “corporate directors and chief 
executives” (code 121) or “directors of 
small ﬁ rms” (code 131). 
    3.  Middle manager. Also using the 
variable occupation, middle managers were 
deﬁ ned as “other managers” (codes 122 
and 123), which includes directors of 
production, ﬁ nance and administration, 
marketing, sales, human resources, and so 
on.
    4.  Best wage in the ﬁ rm. The top wage 
earner in the ﬁ rm was identiﬁ ed. 
The ﬁ rst criterion—owner of the ﬁ rm—
provides an unambiguous identiﬁ cation 
of the person(s) leading the ﬁ rm. Almost 
half the ﬁ rms report information on their 
owner(s), and one-fourth reports just one 
owner. In these cases, the share of females 
in the ﬁ rm leadership was quantiﬁ ed using 
simply the gender composition of the 
owner(s).
Given that the dataset reports very 
detailed occupations, we have a clear idea 
of the tasks performed by each individual. 
Almost all owners are declared as managers 
of the ﬁ rm (7% are top managers, that is, 
corporate directors or directors of small 
ﬁ rms, and 85% are middle managers), 
suggesting these occupations as the key 
ones in terms of ﬁ rm leadership. Firms 
whose owner is reported to be working in 
the ﬁ rm tend not to have wage-earners as 
top managers.2 Therefore, whenever the 
ﬁ rm owner was not reported, we followed 
an alternative procedure to identify the ﬁ rm 
leader(s), relying on its salaried managers. 
We relied ﬁ rst on the top manager; if 
the ﬁ rm had no top managers, we then 
considered middle managers. For ﬁ rms 
whose leadership could not be identiﬁ ed 
using either the owner or manager criteria, 
we considered a third criterion, the best 
paid worker(s) as the one(s) leading the 
ﬁ rm. The share of females leading the ﬁ rm 
was then collapsed into a dichotomous 
2 Just 1% of the ﬁ rms whose owners are present have 
wage-earners as top managers.
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classiﬁ cation: female- and male-led ﬁ rms.3
To summarize, the procedure we 
implemented is as follows. Beginning with 
the owners, a ﬁ rm was deﬁ ned as female-
headed if more than 50% of its owners 
were female (likewise, it was identiﬁ ed as 
male-headed if more than 50% of its owners 
were male; it was not classiﬁ ed if insufﬁ cient 
information was available, such as if exactly 
half the owners were male and half were 
female or no owners were reported). For 
ﬁ rms with insufﬁ cient information on 
the above criterion, we followed a similar 
procedure using the variable top management.
Next, we extended the procedure to middle 
managers and ﬁ nally, if none of the above 
criteria were conclusive, females among 
the top wage in the ﬁ rm were considered. 
Table 1 reports the classiﬁ cation of ﬁ rms 
into male- and female-led as these criteria 
were considered in succession. Appendix B 
reports the results of robustness checks on 
our classiﬁ cation of ﬁ rms into female- and 
male-led once we put into place alternative 
procedures.
Firms not classiﬁ ed as either male- or 
female-led were dropped from the analysis. 
Moreover, some ﬁ rms change classiﬁ cation 
over time. Since wage and other ﬁ rm 
outcomes may reﬂ ect the choices of past 
management, especially in a regulated labor 
market such as that in Portugal, ﬁ rms that 
change classiﬁ cation may bring noise into 
the analysis, a problem that is particularly 
acute if the ﬁ rm changed classiﬁ cation 
more than once. Therefore, in the ﬁ rst 
analysis that follows, only ﬁ rms that either 
never changed classiﬁ cation or changed 
classiﬁ cation only once, maintaining the 
same classiﬁ cation afterwards, were kept 
for analysis.4 This condition led to dropping 
24% of the observations on male-led ﬁ rms 
and dropping 49% of the observations on 
female-led ﬁ rms. As robustness checks, we 
will report results on alternatives for ﬁ rm 
selection.
3 Results do not change qualitatively if we use the 
share of female managers instead, as reported below in 
the robustness checks.
4 We will refer to this sample of ﬁ rms as “all ﬁ rms,” in 
the tables and text that follow.
Wages
Gross monthly ear nings are deﬁ ned as 
monthly base-wage plus seniority-indexed 
components of pay and other regularly 
paid beneﬁ ts. Wages were deﬂ ated using 
the Consumer Price Index (base 2000), 
with wage outliers having been dropped.5
Whenever the ﬁ rm leader was identiﬁ ed as 
the worker with the best wage in the ﬁ rm, 
that worker was dropped from the analysis 
in order to avoid a mechanical relationship 
between the gender of the ﬁ rm leader and 
the worker’s gender pay gap. Appendix 
Tables A2 and A3 provide descriptive 
statistics on the ﬁ rm and worker datasets.
Female-Led Firms                                      
and Male-Led  Firms in Portugal
Women tend to lead smaller ﬁ rms, with 
a strong sectoral concentration in clothing, 
education, and health and social services. 
Female-led ﬁ rms tend to have a younger 
and better educated labor force, and they 
employ predominantly females. Moreover, 
the leadership of female-led ﬁ rms is 
younger and better educated (see Appendix 
Table 2A). The share of female-led ﬁ rms 
in Portugal increased from approximately 
13% in 1987 to 19% in 2000, while their 
employment share increased from 7% to 
14% over the period.
Figure 1 provides a visual description 
of the trend in wage policies for male- 
and female-led ﬁ rms. Male-led ﬁ rms pay 
on average higher wages than female-
led ﬁ rms, for both males (Panel (a)) and 
females (Panel (b)), which could be due 
to their different sectoral and ﬁ rm-size 
composition. The gap between the two 
types of ﬁ rms seems to be larger for male 
workers. Panel (c) illustrates the aggregate 
wages in male- and female-led ﬁ rms. The 
higher differential reﬂ ects the gender-
5 Wages below half the national minimum wage 
or above 20 times the percentile 99 were dropped. 
Outliers in wage growth (log wage change below –.5 
or above 1.5) led to dropping the full history of the 
worker, since mistakes coding the wage in one year 
usually led to outliers in wage growth that carry over 
to the year afterwards (with opposite sign), and thus 
the whole history of the worker was judged unreliable, 
even when not captured as an outlier.
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based employment segregation—female-
led ﬁ rms employ females to a much larger 
extent. Comparing Panels (a) and (b) 
reveals that there is a large gender wage 
gap. Average females’ and males’ wages are 
plotted in Panel (d), which shows that the 
raw gender wage gap in Portugal remained 
roughly stable over time.
Gender Wage Differentials: Can          
Female-Led Firms Make A Difference?
To explore gender wage differentials, 
we use augmented Mincer-type (log) wage 
regressions for males and females separately, 
concentrating in particular on the inﬂ uence 
of the gender of the manager as well as on 
the segregation of the workforce. Table 2 
presents OLS estimates using all ﬁ rms that 
either never changed ownership type or 
changed only once. Table 3 further includes 
ﬁ rm ﬁ xed effects to control for unobserved 
and unobservable ﬁ rm differences which 
might inﬂ uence wage setting. The impact 
of female managers is identiﬁ ed now only 
by changes in the gender of the manager 
within a ﬁ rm. The summary tables provide a 
comparison of the most relevant coefﬁ cients 
estimated under alternative speciﬁ cations. 
The regressions additionally include 
controls for age, tenure, and education 
of the worker; size, industry, region, legal 
setting, and origin of the capital of the 
ﬁ rm; and the year.6 A wider set of estimated 
coefﬁ cients is presented in Appendix Tables 
A4 and A5, for our preferred speciﬁ cation 
(wage regression with ﬁ rm ﬁ xed effects).
At ﬁ rst glance, females do not seem to 
6 Note that in such a large dataset some ﬁ rms are 
observed changing size, major industry, region, legal 
setting, or the origin of their capital.
proﬁ t from having a female boss. Column 
1 of Table 2, for example, shows a negative 
effect for females in female-led ﬁ rms. We 
learn from column 2 that this result seems 
to be due to the fact that there tends to 
be a higher share of females in female-led 
ﬁ rms, which is typically a sign for lower 
pay. Correcting for this and looking at the 
interaction effect (column 3), we see that 
female-led ﬁ rms do pay a premium to the 
ﬁ rst female worker of almost 3%, but this 
advantage becomes smaller the more 
females there are in the ﬁ rm. If 80% of 
the workforce is female, women still earn a 
wage premium of 1% if they are led by a 
female boss, when compared to being led 
by a male boss.
For males, the impact of a female 
manager is deﬁ nitely detrimental. In all 
speciﬁ cations, males earn wages between 
three and six percentage points lower than 
females in female-led ﬁ rms than they do in 
male-led ﬁ rms. Conversely, a larger share of 
female co-workers is associated with higher 
males’ wages. Our results conﬁ rm previous 
studies on segregation effects in Portugal 
(Vieira et al. 2005)—females earn lower 
wages in ﬁ rms with a predominantly female 
workforce whereas males enjoy higher 
wages, which might be interpreted as an 
effect of segregation according to task. 
Males do get the better jobs as supervisors or 
middle managers. The more females there 
are in the workplace, the better the chances 
are for the remaining males to reach a 
supervisory level (see column 2). These 
effects are considerable. The male–female 
wage differential in an almost completely 
female workforce is 20% higher compared 
to an almost completely male workforce.
Our results in Table 2 go beyond these 
insights. Distinguishing between female- 
and male-led ﬁ rms, we ﬁ nd in column 3 
that the overall pattern just described—a 
larger share of female co-workers having 
a positive impact on males’ wages and a 
negative impact on females’ wages—holds 
in male-led ﬁ rms, whereas in female-led 
ﬁ rms both males and females earn lower 
wages the larger the proportion of female 
workers (see the negative interaction 
coefﬁ cient). This result could be due to 
structural differences between ﬁ rms with a 
Criterion  Male -led   
Owners  23,372 131,778 231,218 
Top managers  24,442 138,398 223,528 
Middle managers  33,791 178,584 173,993 
Top wages  83,666 298,680 4,022 
 Female-led
Table 1. Successive Criteria Used to Identify the 
Firm Leadership and its Degree of Femaleness
Note: The (*) signified that information on the criterion is 
either missing or pointing exactly to half males and half 
females in the firm  leadership.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS 
(1987--2000). 
Insuff. Info (*)
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B: Male Workers  (1)  (2)  (3)  
female-led firm  -.052 -.060 -.028 
 (.0008) *** (.0008) *** (.001) *** 
share females   .055 .061 
  (.0009) *** (.0009) *** 
Fem.-led * share fem.    -.082 
   (.003) *** 
Obs.  5674418 5674418 5674418 
R2 .638 .638 .638 
F-statistic  195698 192121.5 188539.2 
 
A: Female Workers  (1) (2) (3)  
female-led firm  -.016 .010 .030 
 (.0005) *** (.0005) *** (.002) *** 
share females   -.139 -.136 
  (.0009) *** (.0009) *** 
fem.-led * share fem.    -.025 
   (.002) *** 
Obs.  2855643 2855643 2855643 
R
2  .702 .705 .705 
F-statistic  132009.8 131188.6 128722.5 
 
Note: Includes controls for age, tenure and education of the worker; size, industry, region, legal setting, 
and origin of the capital of the firm; and year.
***Statistically significant at the.01 level.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987–2000). 
 
Table 2. Summary of Wage Regression, Ordinary Least Squares, All Firms
A: Female Workers  (1) (2) (3) 
female-led firm  .008 .011 .029 
 (.0008) *** (.0008) *** (.002) *** 
share females   –.097 –.093 
  (.002) ***  (.003) ***  
female-led * share fem.    –.025 
   (.003) ***  
Obs.  2855643 2855643 2855643 
R2 .805 .805 .805 
F- statistic  36498.11 35845.37 35170.93 
 
Table 3.  Summary of Wage Regression, Firm Fixed Effects, All Firms
B: Male Workers  (1) (2) (3)  
female-led firm  –.007 –.007 –.004 
 (.001) ***  (.001) ***  (.002) **  
share females   –.017 –.017 
  (.002) *** (.002) *** 
female-led * share fem.    –.009 
   (.004) ***  
Obs.  5674418 5674418 5674418 
R2 .754 .754 .754 
F-statistic 81307.51 79745.49 78240.99 
    
 
Note: Includes controls for age, tenure and education of the worker; size, industry, region, legal 
setting, and origin of the capital of the firm; and year.
**Statistically significant at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987–2000). 
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male- versus female-dominated workforce.
Combining the effect of female 
managers and female workforce, we see 
that women proﬁ t less—perhaps they 
receive less mentoring and protection 
from a female supervisor—if there are 
many female coworkers around. For males, 
the detrimental impact of a female boss is 
ampliﬁ ed if the ﬁ rm’s workforce is also 
female-dominated. In a ﬁ rm with 50% 
females, males working under a female 
manager earn 7 percent less than if they 
were working under a male manager;7 in a 
ﬁ rm with an 80% female workforce, they 
would earn 9.4% less.
Although we do control for a wide set of 
variables, the OLS results might suffer from 
a bias if male- and female-led ﬁ rms differ 
according to unobserved characteristics. 
Therefore, we recourse to ﬁ rm ﬁ xed-effects 
estimates. These results, in Table 3, conﬁ rm 
our main insights: females proﬁ t from a 
female boss and males lose out. Already 
column 1, notwithstanding the gender 
composition of the workforce, illustrates a 
clear picture: females gain 0.8% whereas 
males lose 0.7%. Thus, a female boss reduces 
the wage gap by 1.5%. Extending the 
analysis by also considering the composition 
of the workforce, we see that the results for 
females’ wages are almost unchanged as 
compared to the OLS results, whereas for 
males’ wages, the effects are still present, 
but somewhat smaller.
If one interpreted our results in the 
context of discrimination theories,  one 
might conclude that female employers have 
less of a taste for discrimination compared 
to their male counterparts. Though Becker’s 
taste for discrimination theory, as it relates to 
the employer, would predict higher numbers 
of female workers in female-led (less 
discriminatory) ﬁ rms, Becker’s co-worker 
discrimination theory would require higher 
wages for males to induce them to work in 
a female-dominated workforce. We do see 
this phenomenon in the OLS regressions, 
but it disappears in the ﬁ xed-effects results. 
The ﬁ xed effects seem to capture some 
structural differences among ﬁ rms that were 
7 Computed as –0.028-0.082*0.5.
responsible for the higher effect in the OLS 
model. The moderating effects of female 
dominance on both male and female wages 
in the presence of a female employer are 
consistent with a mentoring story. If female 
employers mentor females, they can do less 
of this if there are many females employed 
in the ﬁ rm, and the remaining male workers 
will increasingly suffer.
Our results are also compatible with 
a model in which job assignment and job 
promotion are important factors that 
determine wages. If employers make 
decisions about promoting workers 
according to the expected duration of stay in 
the ﬁ rm, the fear of pregnancy-related quits 
might lead to the statistical discrimination 
of females (Lazear and Rosen 1990; Winter-
Ebmer and Zweimüller 1997). Because 
there is in general a ﬁ xed number of such 
supervisory jobs, the higher the number of 
potential candidates means the lower the 
odds that an individual person will obtain 
this job. This relationship would explain 
the pattern that in male-managed ﬁ rms a 
higher share of females positively affects 
males’ wages and negatively affects females’ 
wages. Because females are discriminated 
against in promotion decisions, the higher 
the share of females, the less likely it is that 
one of them gets promoted; alternatively, 
the more females there are in a male-led 
ﬁ rm, the easier it is for each individual male 
to ﬁ nish ﬁ rst.
Female managers might either have 
better information about expected 
turnover or they might simply want to break 
this pattern  by mentoring females better 
in order to promote them to supervisory 
jobs. If females do protect fellow females 
in promotion decisions, this would explain 
the positive effect of female managers on 
females’ wages and the negative effect on 
males’ wages. One consequence of this is that 
a higher female share in the ﬁ rm reduces 
the chances for an individual woman to 
secure one of these rare jobs; the average 
wage of females must be lower. Likewise, 
for males, a higher share of females in 
the ﬁ rm increases the competition for the 
remaining males and reduces their chances 
for securing a supervisory position.
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Robustness Checks
Selection of sample
The main results from ﬁ xed-e ffects
regressions demonstrate that female 
managers mentor female workers, in the 
sense that they pay them better wages 
than male managers would. However, the 
possibilities for mentorship get weaker the 
more female co-workers there are employed 
in the ﬁ rm. Here we report several 
robustness checks by changing the selection 
of our samples.
Table 4 presents the results for newly 
founded ﬁ rms. We consider one single 
year of observation for each ﬁ rm, the year 
the ﬁ rm was created.8 It is highly likely that 
incumbent ﬁ rms will have an established 
pay scale. If there are discriminatory 
aspects in these pay scales, then presumably 
many aspects of these pay scales might be 
persistent, notwithstanding a change in 
management. One could assume that newly 
founded ﬁ rms would set a pay scale that is 
much more sensitive to current economic 
and social considerations, and in particular 
female managers may ﬁ nd it easier to escape 
traditional gender-based payment rules. 
This is one way to overcome the problem 
of the sluggishness of changes in the wage 
structure, which might hamper models with 
ﬁ rm ﬁ xed effects.
The results for newly founded ﬁ rms 
do conﬁ rm these expectations. Whereas 
the main pattern is unchanged, female 
workers do proﬁ t to a much greater extent 
from having female bosses compared to 
the previous results. Comparable female 
workers in newly founded female-led ﬁ rms 
earn signiﬁ cantly higher wages than those in 
newly founded male-led ﬁ rms. If half of the 
workforce is female, the gain is 6%; the gain 
is 2.3% if 20% of the coworkers are male 
(and 80% of the coworkers are female). 
Examining newly founded ﬁ rms is also a way 
to tackle the endogeneity problem of the 
choice of a female manager. Using existing 
ﬁ rms, even our ﬁ xed-effects speciﬁ cation 
8 Note that we can only report OLS results here, 
since the inclusion of a ﬁ rm ﬁ xed effect wipes out the 
dummy variable of female management.
cannot rule out a possible endogeneity 
of changes in management. A large share 
of female workers or a more even wage 
structure might make it more probable 
that a female manager takes over. For 
newly founded ﬁ rms, the logical structure 
is different: a ﬁ rm is founded and then 
workers are hired and pay scales are set.
In our second robustness check, we 
included all the ﬁ rms in our sample, 
regardless of whether the gender of their 
leadership changed once or more often. 
However, given that changes implemented 
by the new management may take some 
time to have an impact, we have excluded 
the year the ﬁ rm changed type of leadership 
and the subsequent year from the analysis. 
This again allows some time for changes 
in management to take effect. Results are 
reported in Table 5. Also in this case, results 
are consistent with the ones previously 
reported.
In a third robustness check, we have 
measured the femaleness of the ﬁ rm 
leadership as a continuous variable, instead 
of adopting a dichotomous partition into 
female- or male-led ﬁ rms. The results, 
reported in Table 6, are remarkably 
robust to this change in the form of the 
measurement of our variable of interest.
Different types of ﬁ rms
Firm size might be an imp ortant factor 
in determining the impact of management 
changes on wages. In particular, female-
led ﬁ rms are smaller, and therefore a 
comparison with male-led ﬁ rms might be 
inappropriate. Moreover, ﬁ rm size might be 
important regarding the speed with which 
changes in management can be realized. If 
mentoring is the primary explanation for 
the phenomenon, looking at the gender of 
the CEO alone might be misleading. In a 
large ﬁ rm, mentoring might be delegated 
to much lower levels of management than 
the CEO. For this reason, looking at smaller 
ﬁ rms might be very enlightening.
We have performed identical wage 
regressions separately for small and large 
ﬁ rms. Since a ﬁ rm may change size over 
the period under observation, we have 
considered its average size to deﬁ ne the two 
size categories. Table 7 reports the results 
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A: Female Workers  (1)   (2)  (3) 
female-led firm  –.020  .019  .121 
         (.003) ***        (.003) ***        (.012) *** 
share females   –.214 –.189 
        (.007) ***        (.007) *** 
female–led * share fem.    –.122 
          (.014) *** 
Obs.  42561 42561 42561 
R
2    .612    .621   .621 
F–statistic 1314.587 1337.066 1315.87 
 B: Male Workers    (1)   (2)  (3) 
female-led firm  –.031 –.033 –.011 
        (.005) ***          (.006) *** (.010) 
share females     .010 .022 
   (.010)      (.011) ** 
female–led * share fem.    –.059 
           (.020) *** 
Obs.  48534 48534 48534 
R
2    .532   .532   .532 
F–Statistic  1080.135 1059.384 1039.713 
 Note: Includes controls for age, tenure and education of the worker; size, industry, region, legal 
setting, and origin of the capital of the firm; and year.
**Statistically significant at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987–2000).
 
Table 4. Summary of Wage Regression, Ordinary Least Squares, Just New Firms 
A: Female Workers    (1)    (2)    (3)  
female-led firm  .014  .018  .017 
         (.001) ***          (.001) ***         (.003) *** 
share females   –.095 –.095 
         (.003) ***          (.003) *** 
fem.–led * share fem.    .0008 
    (.004) 
Obs.  2734332 2734332 2734332 
R
2  .808 .808  .808 
F–statistic 35321.18 34685.07 34030.63 
 B: Male Workers    (1)  (2)   (3)  
female-led firm  –.007 –.006 –.007 
         (.002) ***          (.002) ***          (.003) *** 
share females   –.017 –.017 
           (.003) ***          (.003) *** 
fem.–led * share fem.      .001 
    (.006) 
Obs.  5575566 5575566 5575566 
R
2
  .755 .755   .755 
F–statistic  80380.8 78836.48 77348.98 
 Note: Includes controls for age, tenure and education of the worker; size, industry, region, legal setting, and 
origin of the capital of the firm; and year.
***Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987–2000). 
Table 5.  Summary of Wage Regression, Firm Fixed Effects, Excluding Year t 
When Firm Changed Type of Leadership And Year t + 1 
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separately for ﬁ rms with up to 100 workers 
and those with more than 100 workers, 
again using ﬁ rm ﬁ xed effects.9
The general patterns stay the same, in 
that female employers favor female workers. 
It turns out that both male and female 
workers in small ﬁ rms generally proﬁ t 
from the presence of female employers, 
but females proﬁ t to a much greater extent 
than males. Moreover, for men the effect 
turns negative once the share of females in 
the ﬁ rm is above one-third, which is often 
the case. In large ﬁ rms, we see the general 
pattern conﬁ rmed: females’ wages are 
higher in female-led ﬁ rms than they would 
be in male-led ﬁ rms, whereas males' are 
lower in female-led ﬁ rms than they would 
be in male-led ﬁ rms. Consistent with our 
mentoring theory, females in smaller ﬁ rms 
9 Note the small ﬁ rm size structure in this economy. 
Indeed, even after we impose the constraint that the 
ﬁ rm must employ at least 10 workers in at least one 
year, the mean ﬁ rm size is 32 workers (the median is 
12 and the 90-percentile is 52). This is consistent with 
the structure of the overall Portuguese private sector, 
where the average ﬁ rm size is 9 workers and 83% of 
the ﬁ rms have less than 10 workers (data referring to 
2005).
proﬁ t more from a female manager than do 
those in larger ﬁ rms.
Finally, we check the robustness of 
our results for sub-samples of the data 
by differentiating by the type of ﬁ rm 
leader identiﬁ ed in the data—owner, top 
manager(s), other manager(s) or best 
wage in the ﬁ rm.10 Since there are now two 
potential changes in ownership—gender 
and type—we restrict ourselves to the case 
of newly founded ﬁ rms, in which the type of 
ﬁ rm leader is unambiguously identiﬁ able.11 
Results are reported in Table 8. They are, by 
and large, very consistent with the previous 
pattern. With the exception of top managers, 
in which the number of observations is too 
small, females always proﬁ t considerably 
from having a female employer. For males, 
we ﬁ nd practically no effect in the case of 
owners and top managers and negative 
effects for other managers as well as for 
managers identiﬁ ed as earning the highest 
10 For ﬁ rms where the person with the highest wage 
is identiﬁ ed as the boss, this person is always excluded 
from the wage regressions.
11 In fact, if we restricted ourselves to ﬁ rms where 
there is no change in the type of ownership, the 
changes in gender were in some cases too few.
A: Female Workers  
(1) (2) (3) 
female-led firm (continuous)  .009 .012 .026 
        (.0008) ***         (.0008) ***       (.002) *** 
share females   –.098 –.093 
         (.002) ***       (.003) *** 
female-led (continuous) * share fem.    –.021 
         (.003) *** 
Obs.  2855643 2855643 2855643 
R2  .805 .805 .805 
F–statistic 36498.99 35846.83 35172.11 
 
B: Male Workers  (2)  (3)  
female-led firm (continuous)  –.016 –.015 –.017 
          (.0009) ***                 (.001) *** 
share females   –.014 –.015 
         (.002) ***        (.003) *** 
fem.–led (continuous) * share fem.    .007 
      (.004) * 
Obs.  5674418 5674418 5674418 
R2  .754 .754 .754 
F–statistic  81316.32 79753.64 78248.94 
 
(1)
         (.0009) *** 
Table 6. Summary of Wage Regression, Firm Fixed Effects, Femaleness of Firm Leadership 
Measured as Continuous Variable (Instead of Dichotomous)
Note: Includes controls for age, tenure, and education of the worker; size, industry, region, legal setting, and origin of the capital of 
the firm; and year.
*Statistically significant at the .01 level; ***at the .01 level. 
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987–2000).
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wage in the ﬁ rm. The result that female 
owners are positively associated with higher 
female wages is a reassuring sign that, in 
fact, the gender of the owner of the ﬁ rm is 
the decisive factor and not a general female-
friendly policy in a ﬁ rm, which might also 
increase the likelihood of female managers.
Conclusion
In contrast to the textbook model 
of perfec t competition, employers can 
inﬂ uence pay setting and pay structure in 
non-perfect markets. This model should also 
apply to gender-based pay. Beginning with 
Becker (1957), economists have embraced 
the idea that pay differences between men 
and women could be explained by a taste for 
discrimination on the part of the employers. 
Depending on the extent of this distaste and 
the number of discriminating employers, 
a gender wage gap will materialize in 
equilibrium.
In this paper we have investigated the 
potential role the gender of the employer 
or manager could play. Using a large 
longitudinal data set for Portugal, we have 
shown that, indeed, a female-led ﬁ rm raises 
women’s but lowers men’s wages compared 
to a male-led ﬁ rm. These results are robust 
to a set of speciﬁ cation tests. First, we have 
identiﬁ ed the effect only in ﬁ rms that 
changed the gender of the manager in order 
to control for unobserved ﬁ rm-speciﬁ c 
features; second, we used only start-up ﬁ rms 
to allow for a newly decided pay structure; 
and third, we used ﬁ rms that changed 
management more often. Our results are 
consistent with a situation in which job 
promotion is an important part of the pay 
scale and the number of such supervisory 
roles is limited. When female managers 
actively mentor and protect female co-
workers, they may increase the latter’s 
promotion chances and thus their expected 
wage. The higher the share of females in 
the ﬁ rm, the lower the promotion chances 
for any individual, either female or male. 
Though an important factor in the structure 
of male-female wage differentials, the rise in 
female-led ﬁ rms in Portugal is nonetheless 
too small to contribute signiﬁ cantly to the 
narrowing of the overall gender wage gap.
    Small firms Large firms 
 
A: Female Workers  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 
Female-led firm  –.001 .003 .029 .026 .025 .019 
 (.0009)     (.0009) ***       (.003) ***       (.001) ***     (.001) ***      (.004) *** 
share females   –.069 –.063  –.164 –.165 
      (.003) ***     (.003) ***       (.005) ***       (.005) *** 
fem.–led * share fem.    –.035   .008 
     (.004) ***   (.006) 
Obs.  1621216 1621216 1621216 1234427 1234427 1234427 
.75 .75 .75 .813 .813 .813 
F–statistic 18285.12 17953.34 17617.43 18288.13 17972.35 17633.29 
 
B: Male Workers  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
.001 .0004 .014 –.018 –.019 –.037 
 (.001) (.001)       (.002) ***       (.002) ***       (.002) ***       (.003) *** 
share females   .017 .02  –.122 –.124 
       (.003) ***       (.003) ***       (.005) ***       (.005) *** 
fem.–led * share fem.    –.041   .051 
        (.005) ***      (.008) *** 
Obs.  2825907 2825907 2825907 2848511 2848511 2848511 
.692 .692 .692 .741 .741 .741 
F–statistic 31808.13 31197.55 30610.94 50094.55 49153.95 48228.04 
 
Female-led firm
R2
R2
 
Table 7.  Summary of Wage Regression, Firm Fixed Effects, Separately for Small and Large Firms
Note: Small firms defined as having average size (over the period under analysis), below, or equal to 100 
workers. The regression includes controls for age, tenure, and education of the worker, size, industry, region, 
legal setting, and origin of the capital of the firm, and year.
***Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
Source: Computations Based On Portugal, MTSS (1987–2000).
INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW156
    
To
p M
an
ag
ers 
B
es
t W
ag
e
 
A:
 Fe
m
ale
 W
or
ke
rs 
(1
) 
(2
) 
 (3
) 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
)  
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
fe
m
ale
-le
d 
fir
m
  
–.0
06
 
.01
8 
 .0
41
 
.01
1 
.04
4 
.00
3 
–.0
06
 
.04
 
.08
7 
–.0
29
 
.01
7 
.09
9 
 
(.0
04
) 
    
  (
.00
5)
 **
* 
    
 (.
02
0)
**
  
(.0
51
) 
(.0
54
) 
(.1
26
) 
(.0
12
) 
    
(.0
13
) *
**
 
(.0
38
)
**
 
(.0
03
)
 
(.0
04
)
 
(.0
16
)  *
**  
sh
ar
e f
em
ale
s  
 
–.1
5 
–.1
46
 
 
–.1
92
 
–.2
11
 
 
–.2
93
 
–.2
8 
 
–.2
17
 
–.1
94
 
 
 
    
  (
.01
0)
 **
* 
    
  (
.01
1)
 **
* 
 
(.1
12
) *
 
(.1
23
) *
 
 
    
(.0
26
) *
**
 
 
(.0
09
)
**
 
(.0
10
)
***
 
fe
m
.–l
ed
 * 
sh
ar
e f
em
. 
 
 
–.0
26
 
 
 
.07
1 
 
 
–.0
67
 
 
 
–.0
97
 
 
 
 
(.0
23
) 
 
 
(.1
94
) 
 
 
(.0
51
) 
 
 
(.0
19
)
 
O
bs
.  
15
73
2 
15
73
2 
15
73
2 
71
1 
71
1 
71
1 
51
98
 
51
98
 
51
98
 
20
92
0 
20
92
0 
20
92
0 
.47
1 
.47
8 
.47
8 
.65
5 
.65
6 
.65
6 
.67
7 
.68
5 
.68
5 
.57
3 
.58
4 
.58
4 
27
9.4
25
 
28
1.6
6 
27
6.2
74
 
28
.72
4 
28
.23
2 
27
.58
6 
21
1.8
63
 
21
5.2
64
 
21
1.2
64
 
54
8.6
04
 
56
2.6
89
 
55
3.2
78
 
B:
 M
ale
 W
or
ke
rs 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
fe
m
ale
-le
d 
fir
m
  
– .0
00
2 
–.0
00
5 
.00
1 
–.0
22
 
.00
4 
–.0
01
 
–.0
73
 
–.0
69
 
–.0
37
 
–.0
56
 
–.0
49
 
–.0
59
 
 
(.0
08
) 
(.0
08
) 
(.0
12
) 
(.0
51
) 
(.0
53
) 
(.1
57
) 
    
  (
.01
8)
 **
* 
    
(.0
19
) *
**
 
(.0
35
) 
(.0
08
)
 
(.0
15
) *
**
 
sh
ar
e f
em
ale
s  
 
.00
2 
.00
3 
 
–.1
51
 
–.1
51
 
 
–.0
23
 
–.0
12
 
 
–.0
32
 
–.0
38
 
 
(.0
15
) 
(.0
16
) 
 
(.0
97
) 
(.1
00
) 
 
(.0
29
) 
(.0
31
) 
 
(.0
15
)
 
(.0
16
)*
*  
fe
m
.–l
ed
 * 
sh
ar
e f
em
. 
 
 
–.0
07
 
 
 
.01
2 
 
 
–.0
78
 
 
 
.02
5 
 
 
 
(.0
29
) 
 
 
(.3
58
) 
 
 
(.0
72
) 
 
 
(.0
29
) 
O
bs
.  
19
79
5 
19
79
5 
19
79
5 
12
55
 
12
55
 
12
55
 
70
57
 
70
57
 
70
57
 
20
42
7 
20
42
7 
20
42
7 
R2
  
.42
5 
.42
5 
.42
5 
.68
5 
.68
6 
.68
6 
.60
3 
.60
3 
.60
3 
.40
8 
.40
8 
.40
8 
F–
sta
tis
tic
  
29
2.1
56
 
28
6.4
14
 
28
0.8
93
 
58
.45
8 
57
.30
7 
56
.04
1 
20
8.4
94
 
20
4.4
88
 
20
0.6
57
 
27
5.0
86
 
26
9.9
36
 
26
4.8
53
 
 
R2
  
O
w
ne
rs
**
*
F–
sta
tis
tic
  
    
 
(.0
09
)
 
**
*
N
ot
e:
 I
n
cl
ud
es
 c
on
tr
ol
s 
fo
r 
ag
e,
 te
n
ur
e,
 a
n
d 
ed
uc
at
io
n
 o
f t
h
e 
w
or
ke
r;
 s
iz
e,
 in
du
st
ry
, r
eg
io
n
, l
eg
al
 s
et
ti
n
g,
 a
n
d 
or
ig
in
 o
f t
h
e 
ca
pi
ta
l o
f t
h
e 
fi
rm
; a
n
d 
ye
ar
.
*S
ta
ti
st
ic
al
ly
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
t a
t t
h
e 
.1
0 
le
ve
l; 
**
at
 th
e 
.0
5 
le
ve
l; 
**
*a
t t
h
e 
.0
1 
le
ve
l. 
So
ur
ce
: C
om
pu
ta
ti
on
s 
B
as
ed
 O
n
 P
or
tu
ga
l, 
M
T
SS
 (
19
87
–2
00
0)
.
O
th
er
 M
an
ag
er
s (.0
28
)*
**
* **
*
**
**
T
ab
le
 8
. 
S
u
m
m
ar
y 
o
f 
W
ag
e 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
, 
O
rd
in
ar
y 
L
ea
st
 S
q
u
ar
es
, 
Ju
st
 N
ew
 F
ir
m
s,
 S
ep
ar
at
el
y 
fo
r 
E
ac
h
 C
ri
te
ri
o
n
 t
h
at
 E
n
ab
le
d
 
Id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
F
ir
m
 L
ea
d
er
sh
ip
: 
O
w
n
er
s(
s)
, 
T
o
p
 M
an
ag
er
(s
),
 O
th
er
 M
an
g
er
(s
),
 o
r 
B
es
t 
W
ag
e 
FEMALE-LED FIRMS AND GENDER WAGE POLICIES 157
Appendix Table A2
Descriptive Statistics on the Firm
    Note: Reports firms that changed ownership type once or never.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987–2000).
 Male-led Firms Female-led Firms 
Variable Mean   Std. Dev.  Mean   Std. Dev. 
Firm size (log)   2.714   1.055   2.522   0.861  
Firm age   23.859   19.237   22.647   36.582  
Share females   0.255   0.251   0.797   0.272  
Av. schooling (yrs)   6.283   2.327   6.908   2.454  
Av. age   35.824   6.02   33.789   6.492  
Av. age firm leader   43.312   9.741   38.021   10.178  
Av. schooling firm leader   8.24   4.335   9.26   4.567  
Female-led firm (continuous variable)   0.036   0.12   0.958   0.132  
Legal setting       
sole proprietorship   0.067     0.104    
partnership   0.803     0.613    
joint stock   0.093     0.038    
other   0.035     0.245    
Ownership       
public   0.005     0.002    
foreign   0.036     0.019    
Location       
Center Coast   0.186     0.127    
Lisbon   0.354     0.348    
Inland and South   0.127     0.123    
Industry       
textiles   0.035     0.048    
clothing, leather   0.063     0.267    
wood, cork   0.072     0.018    
paper, printing   0.028     0.012    
chemicals   0.025     0.01    
stone, clay, glass   0.038     0.015    
basic metals   0.008     0.001    
metal prod, machin.   0.109     0.021    
elect., water   0.001     0.000    
construction   0.167     0.028    
wholesale trade   0.122     0.051    
retail trade   0.104     0.087    
restaurants, hotels   0.052     0.041    
transport, communic.   0.038     0.016    
banking, insurance   0.011     0.004    
real estate   0.02     0.018    
education   0.008     0.106    
health, social serv.   0.006     0.172    
other   0.051     0.067    
N 218980 40350 
 
APPENDIX A
Appendix Table A1
Initial Sample Sizes: Number of Unit-Year Observations
 Firm size restriction   Workers  Firms  Owners  Female owners 
 No size restriction  17,116,973  1,457,183  1,192,282  302,265  
Firms ever having more
than 10  
13,202,761  386,368  297,982  63,291  workers
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987--2000).
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  Males   Females  
Variable  Mean   Std. Dev.  Mean   Std. Dev. 
Wage(log)   11.769   11.488   0.479  
Female-led firm (dichotomous variable)   0.034     0.196    
Female-led firm (continuous variable)   0.081   0.2   0.235   0.378  
Share females   0.207   0.189   0.571   0.281  
Age   38.065   11.653   34.123   10.425  
Tenure   10.038   9.521   8.261   8.408  
Tenure <  =1   0.126     0.137    
Education       
4 yrs   0.473     0.4    
6 yrs   0.191     0.212    
9 yrs   0.115     0.128    
12 yrs   0.127     0.166    
16 yrs   0.054     0.059    
Firm size (log)   5.032   2.101   4.625   1.846  
Legal setting       
sole proprietorship   0.021     0.025    
partnership   0.505     0.562    
joint stock   0.373     0.28    
other   0.032     0.105    
Ownership       
public   0.134     0.067    
foreign   0.097     0.114    
Location       
Center Coast   0.134     0.154    
Lisbon   0.485     0.415    
Inland and South   0.077     0.09    
Industry       
textiles   0.051     0.107    
clothing, leather   0.028     0.19    
wood, cork   0.048     0.033    
paper, printing   0.024     0.019    
chemicals   0.04     0.028    
stone, clay, glass   0.04     0.028    
basic metals   0.018     0.004    
metal prod, machinery   0.141     0.081    
elect., water   0.028     0.009    
construction   0.149     0.018    
wholesale trade   0.081     0.068    
retail trade   0.057     0.067    
restaurants, hotels   0.024     0.049    
transport, communication   0.104     0.046    
banking, insurance   0.059     0.049    
real estate   0.013     0.012    
education   0.004     0.029    
health, social serv.   0.004     0.057    
other  0.045     0.051    
N 5674418 2855643 
 
Appendix Table A3
Descriptive Statistics on the Worker
    Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987–2000).
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Appendix Table A4
Wage Regression, Firm Fixed Effects, Female Workers, All Firms
                                  Note: Includes controls for industry (19 dummies), year, and region (3 dummies).
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987–2000).
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
 female-led firms  .008 .011 .029 
 (.0008) *** (.0008) *** (.002) ** 
share females   -.097 -.093 
  (.002) *** (.003) *** 
fem.-led * share fem.    -.025 
   (.003) *** 
age  .026 .025 .025 
 (.00008) *** (.00008) *** (.00008) *** 
age sq.  -.0003 -.0003 -.0003 
 (1.10e-06) *** (1.10e-06) *** (1.10e-06) *** 
tenure  .008 .008 .008 
 (.00003) *** (.00003) *** (.00003) *** 
tenure < 1  -.060 -.060 -.060 
 (.0004) *** (.0004) *** (.0004) *** 
educ: 4 yrs  .085 .085 .085 
 (.0008) *** (.0008) *** (.0008) *** 
educ: 6 yrs  .179 .179 .179 
 (.0008) *** (.0008) *** (.0008) *** 
educ: 9 yrs  .302 .301 .301 
 (.0009) *** (.0009) *** (.0009) *** 
educ: 12 yrs  .376 .375 .375 
 (.0009) *** (.0009) *** (.0009) *** 
educ: 16 yrs  .805 .804 .804 
 (.001) *** (.001) *** (.001) *** 
firm size (log)  .013 .012 .012 
 (.0004) *** (.0004) *** (.0004) *** 
sole proprietorship  .022 .024 .024 
 (.007) *** (.007) *** (.007) *** 
partnership  .054 .054 .055 
 (.002) *** (.002) *** (.002) *** 
joint stock  .041 .042 .042 
 (.001) *** (.001) *** (.001) *** 
other  .027 .027 .027 
 (.003) *** (.003) *** (.003) *** 
public  -.044 -.043 -.043 
 (.001) *** (.001) *** (.001) *** 
foreign  .001 .0009 .0008 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Obs.  2855643 2855643 2855643 
R2  .805 .805 .805 
F-statistic  36498.11 35845.37 35170.93 
 
Variable
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Appendix Table A5
Wage Regression, Firm Fixed Effects, Male Workers, All Firms
        Note: Includes controls for industry (19 dummies), year, and region (3 dummies).
        **Statistically significant at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. 
        Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1987–2000).
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
 
 female-led firms  -.007 -.007 -.004 
(.001)***  (.001)***    (.002)**  
share females   -.017 -.017 
 (.002)***      (.002)***  
fem.-led * share fem.   -.009 
    (.004)**  
age  .044 .044 .044 
(.00007) ***    (.00007) ***      (.00007)***  
age sq.  -.0004 -.0004 -.0004 
(8.39e-07) ***    (8.39e-07) ***       (8.39e-07)***  
tenure  .008 .008 .008 
(.00002) ***   (.00002) ***     (.00002) *** 
tenure < 1  -.050 -.050 -.050 
(.0004) *** (.0004)     (.0004) *** 
educ: 4 yrs  .145 .145 .145 
(.0006) ***    (.0006) ***    (.0006) *** 
educ: 6 yrs  .241 .241 .241 
(.0007) ***   (.0007) ***    (.0007) *** 
educ: 9 yrs  .346 .346 .346 
(.0007) ***    (.0007) ***     (.0007) ***  
educ: 12 yrs  .434 .434 .434 
(.0007) ***   (.0007) ***     (.0007) *** 
educ: 16 yrs  .963 .963 .963 
(.0008) ***   (.0008) ***    (.0008) *** 
firm size (log)  .010 .010 .010 
(.0004) ***   (.0004) ***     (.0004) *** 
sole proprietorship  .027 .028 .028 
(.006) ***  (.006) ***    (.006) *** 
partnership  .054 .054 .054 
(.001) ***  (.001) ***      (.001) *** 
joint stock  .049 .049 .049 
(.0009) *** (.0009) ***     (.0009) *** 
other  -.012 -.012 -.012 
(.002) *** (.002) ***    (.002) *** 
public  -.024 -.024 -.024 
(.0008) *** (.0008) ***    (.0008)***  
foreign  -.002 -.002 -.002 
(.0009)**  (.0009)**  (.0009)**  
Obs.  5674418 5674418 5674418 
R2  .754 .754 .754 
F-statistic  81307.51 79745.49 78240.99 
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APPENDIX B
Alternative Procedure to Identify the Firm Leadership
We have checked the robustness of our 
classiﬁ cation of male- and female-led ﬁ rms. 
Whereas the ﬁ rst criterion used to deﬁ ne the 
ﬁ rm leadership--its owner--raises no doubts, 
the order in which the other variables are 
considered may be less consensual, and 
one could argue for instance that the best 
paid worker is more likely to be the ﬁ rm 
leader, even if he or she does not formally 
hold the title of manager. We have therefore 
identiﬁ ed the person leading the ﬁ rm using 
the criteria in the following alternative 
sequence: (1) owner of the ﬁ rm; (2) top 
wage earner in the ﬁ rm; (3) highest-level 
manager; (4) middle manager. 
     Appendix Table B1 reports the cross 
-classiﬁ cation using the two procedures. 
Almost all the ﬁ rms (99%) classiﬁ ed as male 
-headed under procedure 1 receive the same 
classiﬁ cation under procedure 2. For female-
headed ﬁ rms, that share is 95%. The two 
procedures lead to very similar classiﬁ cations 
of ﬁ rms. It is more plausible, however, that 
a worker reported as manager will make the 
crucial decisions in the company--including 
setting the pay scales--compared to a 
specialized worker whose wage may be very 
high due to market constraints.12 Indeed, 
it is a standard procedure in the literature 
to identify the ﬁ rm leadership by looking 
at the top executive jobs (see Bell 2005; 
Smith et al. 2005; and Melero 2004). We 
have therefore proceeded in our analysis by 
using the ﬁ rst procedure described above, 
but results using the second procedure are 
very similar.
12 In ﬁ rms that have top managers, wages higher than 
his or hers occur for occupations such as accountants, 
Appendix Table B1   
Classification of Firms into Male- and Female-Led Using Alternative Procedures 
 Procedure 2  
Procedure 1  Male-led Female-led Insuf. info. Total 
Male-led  296,031 2,649   298,680
Female-led  3,810 79,856   83,666 
Insuf. info.      4,022 4,022 
Total  299,841 82,505 4,022 386,368
professionals of intermediate level in ﬁ nancial and 
commercial services, and salespersons.
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